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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Degree:

Maritime cybersecurity - comparing practices
between developing countries and developed
countries - the case study of Kenya and Spain.
Master of Science

The rapid technological change in the maritime industry requires a consciousness of
the impacts and scope of cyber threats and cybersecurity risks. This study investigated
the relationship between maritime cybersecurity risks and threat mitigation measures,
comparing developed – Spain, and developing – Kenya – IMO member states. Using
a case study approach with a qualitative research design and focusing on cybersecurity
in port operations and shipping, the study results showed that the cybersecurity
strategy implementation in Europe far outpaces that of Africa. The study established
that the models of cybersecurity measures pursued by European and African ports
faced an outstanding risk accrued to the slow adaptation of cybersecurity strategy,
implementation to the rapid change in technology and innovation such that these
strategies become obsolete before optimal use. This is in addition to infrastructure
challenges, talent for cybersecurity, technology, strategy, governance, crime/fraud,
reputation, and regulation, among others.
The study demonstrated the need for cybersecurity to be incorporated into both the
European and African maritime security apparatuses and frameworks by
institutionalizing the responses of member states in relation to these types of security
risks including raising awareness around the vulnerability and cyber threats
concerning the maritime sphere.
The research concludes by stating that, greater effort should be focused towards
making sure maritime cybersecurity keeps up the with the changes in technology.
Given the pervasiveness of non-African indication on maritime cybersecurity
incidents, increased Africa-specific knowledge and research is required.
KEY WORDS: Maritime Cybersecurity, Maritime cyber policy, Port
Digitalization, Port energy management, Maritime cyber systems, Information
security.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1.

Introduction and background

Globalization has manifested in fast-paced innovations and developments, especially
in the area of technology and cyber-systems (Frøystad et al., 2017).This has affected
all sectors including the maritime sector. The global maritime sector has over the past
decade seen the proliferation of the use of cyber systems (International Maritime
Organization, 2017) for example maritime control systems (Lag et al., 2015), and
maritime navigation systems (Lloyd's Register, 2017), bridge systems, communication
systems, machinery control and propulsion systems, access control systems, cargo
handling and management systems etc. These systems have helped improve
operational efficiency, marine human resources productivity, and have helped
optimize performance in the maritime sector. The advent of the Internet of Things
(IoT) where devices interact with each other with little or no autonomy has led to
increasing interdependence of one system to another.
However, the interdependence on these systems and their increasingly inextricable
interactions poses a threat in the likelihood of any cyberattacks (World Economic
Forum, 2020). The development of cyber systems has met serious security threats
globally (Viano, 2017) and the maritime sector has not been spared these
threats(Robert Lemos, 2019). The threats manifest on ships in areas such as ICT
systems on ships that are connected to the internet, communication systems, geolocation systems and at the ports in areas such as Port-office IT Systems, AIS
(Automatic Identification Systems) gateways, Vessels Traffic Services (VTS), and
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) (MARSH, 2014). Time has shown that these threats
have had grave consequences for ships, their personnel, ports, states and their
economies(Rose et al., 2017).
Efforts have been made at global, continental, regional and state level to prepare for
and mitigate threats to maritime cyber systems through the introduction of
cybersecurity guidelines (International Maritime Organization, 2017), the creation of
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maritime cybersecurity bodies or organizations like the Baltic and International
Maritime Council (BIMCO) (Baltic and International Maritime Council, 2020) or
event state-level maritime cybersecurity laws (Ringsberg & Cole 2020) . The pace of
state regulation and management of these cyber systems has not matched the rate at
which these systems are being developed and adopted (Tam & Jones, 2018) as well as
the speed at which malicious attacks are growing (Hellenic Shipping News, 2020)
more so, when looking at third world and developing nations.
Research (Hellenic Shipping News, 2020) shows that the threat of cybersecurity is not
about to reduce. While many developed states for example European states like
Sweden (The Swedish Club, 2021) have instituted measures against maritime
cybersecurity threats, in line with IMO’s maritime cybersecurity guidelines
(International Maritime Organisation, 2017) and European Maritime Cybersecurity
standards (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, (ENISA), 2020), poor and
developing states in sub-Saharan Africa for example Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
have a long way to go (Reva, 2020). Research has shown an increasing interest in
helping build cybersecurity capability through the use of cybersecurity maturity
models(Baltic and International Maritime Council, 2020) but this has largely remained
a preserve of developed states.

Cyber Systems and Port Energy Management
According to (UNCTAD, 2019), the digitalization of oceanic transport can be
categorized into phases. In the first phase, the focus of this study, smart logistics
operations are known to have now to a noteworthy fall in expenditures on inventory
assets and at the same time, more money is being spent on reliable, fast and just-intime conveyances. More and more port terminal processes and ship navigation are
becoming automated – even in developing countries. A number of recent initiatives
are gauging the optimization chances that concurrently come with these novel
technologies. Optimization of port-call is, for example, optimizing vessel routes and
speeds thereby reducing waiting times in ports and subsequently carbon-dioxide
emissions (Port of Rotterdam, 2018). The authorities of ports and operators of
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terminals have galvanized forces to optimize port and intermodal connections (Global
Institute of Logistics., 2017).
According to (Container x-change, 2020), ports utilize IoT and big data for resourceful
decision making and management of logistics, ports can also make use of big data and
predictive analysis to schedule the vessel’s arrival/departure for just-in-time (JIT)
arrival thereby improving the overall efficiency of ports. If this is done, it would help
in congestion management on the ports by circumventing ship idling and as well as
preventing them from using up excess power on ports. It would also additionally save
ship fuel by way of controlled ship speed, and at the same time cutting down emissions.
Additionally, it should be noted that adopting automation, smart technology and IoT
would go a long way in helping to reduce the carbon footprint massively through better
asset management and port operations.

1.2.

Problem Statement

The advent, use and adoption of cyber technology/cyber systems in the maritime
sector, while improving operational and transactional efficiency (Lloyd's Register,
2017) has not been in synch with both the pace of change in this technology as with
other sectors (Lehto, 2020), the rate of growth of malicious attacks (Androjna et al.,
2020) as well as IMO-member states’ creation of regulations to stem the risks accrued
to the adoption of this cyber technology for day-to-day work (Hopcraft & Martin,
2018) . This aside, the rate of regulation differs greatly between developed states and
undeveloped states and little attention has been paid to supporting developing states
through a maritime cybersecurity maturity journey. If the adoption and regulation rate
continue in a “business-as-usual” style, the maritime sector faces potential catastrophic
cybersecurity risks/threats (Hellenic Shipping News, 2020). Further to that, the
disparity in implementation of cybersecurity guidelines/measures across IMO
member-states leaves the maritime cybersecurity ecosystem open to cyber threats.
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1.3.

Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between maritime
cybersecurity risks and threat mitigation measures across developed and developing
IMO member states.

1.4.

Objectives of the study

1. To establish the difference between the developed countries (for example,
Spain) and developing countries (for example, Kenya) with respect to:
a. maritime cybersecurity threats
b. Maritime cybersecurity threat mitigation measures
c. Maritime cybersecurity maturity
2. To examine the difference between developed countries (Spain) and
developing countries (Kenya) with regard to implementation of IMO’s
maritime cybersecurity guidelines.
3. To identify and recommend state-level maritime cybersecurity initiatives that
would help developing countries improve their maritime cybersecurity
maturity.
1.5.

Research Questions
1. How can the difference between developed countries (Spain) and developing
countries (Kenya) with respect to maritime cybersecurity threats, mitigation
measures, and maturity and implementation in relation to IMO’s maritime
cybersecurity guidelines be examined and established?
2. How can the challenges and barriers to maritime cybersecurity implementation
in developed countries (Spain) and developing countries (Kenya) be
examined?
3. How can state-level maritime cybersecurity initiatives that would help
developing countries improve their maritime cybersecurity maturity be
identified and recommended?
4.
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1.6.

Limitations of the Study

Some respondents did not feel free to share all the information that was necessary for
the study. To mitigate this limitation, the researcher explained all the study objectives
and assured the respondents that information provided would be dealt with
confidentially and would only be used for study purposes.
Setting and managing the interview appointments was a problem which led to delay in
the schedule of the research. This was alleviated by use of a data collection guide,
specifically, interview guide.
This research used only two (2) ports as case study. However, this is a rather small
number to explain the entire population of ports. To enhance the robustness of the
results, one should expand this sample. With a larger sample, the results found are
more representative for the entire population of ports.
The study relied majorly on port employees and not much on other parties that may
impact and influence cybersecurity implementation in ports such as MartitmeTech,
and BigTech etc. Further study could be carried out to cover these parties.
Reliance on reports that may convey biased portrait: Some documentary sources on
which this dissertation relied for data were produced by the case organizations. One
might consider that they convey a biased portrait of cybersecurity implementation in
the organization. However, the documents used as data sources are not entirely reports
on cybersecurity, but also internal documents aimed at the organization themselves
that provide policy and operational guidance of how the port implements
cybersecurity.
Finally, due to the short timescale of the research in regard with and comparison to the
research area, the researcher was not able to study exhaustively further in the field.
The researcher therefore chose to limit the scope of the study by using two case
organizations only as target population.

5

1.7

Research Outline

This dissertation consists of six chapters organized as follows; Chapter one introduces
the research topic, giving the background relating to cybersecurity implementation in
the maritime industry, the problem statement, the research objectives and questions,
and the limitation of the research. In chapter two, existing literature on maritime
cybersecurity is reviewed, analyzing its implementation in ports including the policy
and regulation. Chapter three explains the methods used to collect and analyze the
data, describing the framework used. Chapter four looks at the cybersecurity
implementation practices in developing (Kenya) and developed countries (Spain),
including policies, frameworks and best practices in ports from the international,
regional and national perspectives. Chapter five covers the case study of Mombasa
port in Kenya and Valencia port in Spain with respect to maritime cybersecurity
implementation practices. The findings of the research are consequently presented
under chapter five, highlighting the cybersecurity implementation practices of the two
ports with respect to international standards especially the IMO guidelines. The
conclusion and recommendations to beneficiaries follow in chapter six. The approach
used to conduct the research is illustrated in Figure 1.1.

6

Figure 1.1: Flowchart showing the research approach (Source: Author)
The approach taken meant to address the research questions in order to achieve the
stated objectives of the study. A discussion of the finding was made, and
recommendations on cybersecurity implementation at Mombasa port and also port of
Valencia was discussed to help port management and stakeholders make smart
decisions during investments and implementation.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.

An analysis of port digitalization

Digitalization holds extraordinary possibilities for improving the effectiveness,
adaptability and agility of maritime transport chains. It hence builds the capability of
ports to face globalization and urbanization challenges. Digital and electronic
solutions can help improve the effectiveness of harbours their respective transport
chains, expanding them and disentangling their complex formations and decreasing
energy utilization. Within the worldwide sea-environment economy, automation and
computerization of seaports operations provide the impetus to promote effectiveness
and security along the sea transport value chain. Ports are now able to create and
utilize contemporary commerce models (Fraunhofer, 2021).
Industry /business 4.0 – associated with a fourth industrial revolution is manifested in
the permeation of individual and social lives by inter-connected and novel
technologies, business processes and ideas like cloud computing, big data, selfadministration by machines and mobile computing, automated and self-navigation
modules and services.

Industry/ Business 4.0 is therefore becoming a critical

requirement for economic growth (Broy,2010), Industry 4.0 leverages data,
Information and communication technologies (ICT) (Keller, M., Pütz, S., & Siml, J,
2012). Like other industries, the maritime sector interactively leverages computing for
example, working with digitized items through of storage, networking,
programmability, sensors or capability which can permit a rise within the potency of
operations of ports and ships (Jahn et al., 2011). According to (Berg & Hauer, 2015),
the shipping industry utilizes weather data, log files from Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS), fuel-sampling data, and big data to analyze and subsequently compare
business and operational performance with alternative firms. The maritime industry
therefore leverages transport processes that are multimodal that are networked and
synchronized across the maritime transport value chain by independent actors thereby
optimizing traffic and product movements (Berg & Hauer, 2015).
Digital transformation and the utilization of big data utilization enable the optimization
of fleet controls, in such a way that the environmental protection is improved and costs
8

reduced. It is possible to optimize the control and flow of traffic by using the operating
data of ships, subsequently avoiding crucial circumstances and therefore decreasing
the likelihood of accidents. Ship data, for example, aggregated, cargo, weather and
machine data, are transferred in real time to inland/on-port management in real time
thereby enabling a two-way interaction between the aggregated data and the ship’s
management (Arndt, 2016). The downside to this digital revolution include ethics
issues like privacy, reduced self-sufficiency and increased reliance of customers on
ICT firms, all of which represent moral and ethical challenges from an economic,
information al and technological perspective (Bendel, 2015).
To this effect, the success of technological and digital transformation of in the
maritime supply-chain is contingent on the inclusion of data security and data
protection the port management implementation strategy. Operation and management
of digital applications and technologies doesn't solely need competent users well
versed with digital platforms or innovations, but rather guaranteed systems security,
internal infrastructure and operating systems’ protection from cyberattacks for
maritime firms (Schweer & Sahl, 2016). It should therefore be noted that the maritime
supply chain digitalization and the subsequent effects associated to it are a gigantic
field that require structuring and prioritization scientifically.

2.2.

Taxonomy of Maritime Cyber Threat

It should be pointed out that there is a lengthy account of an attempt to build
consciousness in the maritime industry’s operations to cyber threats and their impacts
albeit from an exclusively physical perspective. Recently, the evolution of the
maritime industry has driven it towards an over reliance on technology. This literature
gives a comprehensive view of contemporary cyber security in the maritime industry,
including ultra-modern and cyber-attacks threats. There has been an upsurge in the
volume of cyber threats (Burt, 2020), (The Maritime Executive, 2020), and on the
other hand, the world maritime fleet is continuously growing for example 18.2%
between 2015 and 2020 (Infomaritime, 2021) and are constantly becoming more and
more dependent technologically. (Burt, 2020) for example argues that Internet of
Things (IoT) threats commonly associated with the maritime industry are rapidly and
9

increasingly snowballing and evolving. The beginning of 2020 saw an estimated 30%
upsurge in general volume of attack in comparison with the 2019’s second half year.
This summarizes the seriousness of the issue.
Cybersecurity threats and challenges in the maritime industry fall under three key
themes (The Computer Society, 2020).
I.

Distortion: This is the use of robots and bots to spread of deception thereby
compromising of belief in authenticity when judging data.

II.

Disruption: Over-dependence on delicate networks increases the likelihood
and hazard of planned network blackouts thereby compromising trade
operations. For example, ransomware can be used by cyber criminals to capture
the IoT.

III.

Deterioration: quick pushes in savvy advances as well as clashing requests
carried out by states aimed at advancing national and transnational security
shall affect an enterprises’ ability to govern data.

The maritime industry should therefore stay ahead in the following cyber threats facing
the industry as argued by (The Computer Society, 2020) and (Kimberly et al., 2016).
Social Engineering Attacks: Social engineering assaults such as phishing has for a long
time been utilized by aggressors to trap casualties into surrendering delicate data like
login subtle elements and credit card data. Despite the attempts by organizations to
improve e-mail security in detecting and blocking phishing assaults, cybercriminals
are concurrently improving phishing packs that help breach these security barriers and
allow for extortion of ransoms.
Out of Date Software: Software on sea vessels tends to be obsolete owing to; First, the
construction of massive ships is costly and time-consuming and most ships were built
prior to the emergence cyber security as a major concern. Besides, it is not exceptional
for unused computer programs to be incongruent with more seasoned equipment.
Hence, outdated programs are frequently kept in utilization.
Vulnerability of Systems: Port systems or ships risk being compromised in an attempt
to seize cargo. For example, the ECDIS framework that shows computerized naval
10

charts is open to compromise (Dyryavyy, 2015) by altering records and embedding
content that is malicious.
Cyber Hijacks: Cyber-attacks on different on-board ship or vessel systems or
structures may give aggressors control of these targets with a likelihood diverse
consequences. For example, posting false information, scrambling key records or
framework components and obstructions. The frequent incidence of ransomware in
conventional computing and mobile devices is only a step away from being
acclimatized to the oceanic space.
AI-enhanced Cyber threats: The disruption of AI and Machine Learning (ML) has
permeated each and every industry. AI is being embraced in the maritime industry
due to its capacity to support critical decision-making in the administration of the
supply chain, marketing, security, manufacturing and other areas. The AI capabilities
utilized to recognize and halt cyberattacks is now being utilized to transmit
contemporary cyberattacks within computer programs. AI fuzzing (AIF) and Machine
Learning (ML) harming are all set to be the following enormous cybersecurity dangers
in the maritime industry.
Profit and Cost Axis: Profit-driven malware are getting to be simpler and cheaper to
make. Instruments for malware improvement and misuse units are common
instruments for aggressors, so that naiveté programmers can cause noteworthy harm.
Besides, the low cost of tools required to hack maritime systems has made it easier for
cyber criminals given that the systems they attack are mostly obsolete and rudimentary
in comparison with other targets.
This study will investigate the relationship between maritime cybersecurity risks and
threat mitigation measures across developed and developing IMO member states with
the case study being the port of Valencia in Spain and Mombasa in Kenya. The study
will cover both port authorities, ship proprietors, nation governments and other
stakeholders and will assess the maritime cybersecurity implementation practices of
the two countries and discuss the implementation scenarios of maritime technology
and cybersecurity for additional benefits to be realized. These are explained under
chapter six of this dissertation.
11

2.3.

Cybersecurity and the Maritime Supply Chain

Innovations in Technology have remodelled the globe by altering the landscape of
personal communication and expediting the growth of mobile commerce and telework
as examples and the commercial landscape has additionally been altered as a result of
numerous supporting technologies that are connected to Industry 4.0 as argued by
(Culot et al., 2020), Industry 4.0 originated in 2011 from a German technology project.
The term refers to the increase in digitalization of processes of industrial activities as
argued by (BMBF, 2018).One outstanding technology of Industry 4.0 is IoT, which
according to (Li, S. et al., 2015) involves a human-less connection and interaction of
various uniquely identified devices. With the term being applied in a business context
including maritime, supply chain, and manufacturing, among others, it has taken up
the name Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT). (Acharjya et al., 2017) define IIOT as
“a network paradigm that consists of physical elements, platforms and software to
communicate and share data between them in (a) smart manner”. Another related
theory, the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) defines IIOT as “a next-generation network
connected collection of loosely coupled distributed cyber systems and physical
systems monitored/controlled by user defined semantic laws, where cyber systems
refer to the collections of control logic and sensor units, and physical systems refer to
the collections of actuator units”. (Ying Tan et al., 2008) and (Greer et al., 2019) argue
that CPS and IIoT are essentially hybrid systems that include logical and physical
constituents. They state that this system setup raises potential challenges from the
cybersecurity viewpoint in the maritime industry.
The maritime logistics sector has drone and robot technologies that are being espoused
to expedite movement, distribution and storage of goods and enhance customer service
and order fulfilment (Azadeh et al., 2019) ; (Agatz et al., 2018). The key challenge is
to manage the integrity of data to have adequate quality assurance of the supply chain
and logistics services in the maritime sector and this disquiet can be easily addressed
through the implementation of block chain technologies side by side with platforms
for Industry 4.0. (Li & Zhou, 2020) argue that block chain assimilates the openness of
the internet with the function of security attached to cryptography that provides the
maritime firms including shipping agents a faster means to validate crucial transaction
12

information thereby establishing trust in the supply chain. All these can be
implemented in the shipping industry by way of helping in data search between
different ports (Toll, 2020). It should be noted however that, all these advanced and
novel technologies in the maritime sector that supports logistics and supply chains
come with risks (Kianieff et al., 2019).
In embracing advanced and inter-linked digital technologies, the maritime sector is
concurrently faced with an increase in cyber risk – a risk that exists in the cyberspace
(Cheung & Bell, 2021). In 2017, AP Moller-Maersk, the Danish shipping giant was
reportedly smashed by a ransomware known as NotPetya which made the company to
lose finances in its logistics business to the tune of millions of dollars. In the same
year, Svitzer Australia – one of AP Moller-Maersk’s subsidiaries experienced a breach
of their data through email accounts that were compromised such that they robotically
forwarded mail to external accounts. These mails contained financial information that
was sensitive (Cheung & Bell, 2021) Toll Group is another example of a third-party
logistics service provider of Australian origin that was attacked by ransomware called
Nefilim in January 2020 and subsequently in May 2020 by the same ransomware
(Lennane, 2020). The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA) has defined Cybersecurity as “the collection of tools, policies, security
concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the
cyber environment and organisation and user’s assets”. According to this definition, it
shows that for cybersecurity to be successfully implemented, it has to reside at the
center of the governance process of a company management.
This study looks beyond this literature review and focuses on the measures aimed at
improving cybersecurity in ports and the maritime logistics and supply chain.
2.4.

Maritime Cyber Policy and Regulations

Up to the end of 2018, the world-wide enactment and implementation of sturdy policy
for maritime cybersecurity was basically non-extant. The year 2013 saw the first
assessment of maritime cybersecurity situation by the EU. It noted the international
unawareness of maritime cybersecurity, the bias of existing policy towards physical
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safety and security (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, (ENISA), 2020). Not
until recent cyber-attacks has there been the impetus to institutionalize prevention of
maritime cyber-attacks(Gallagher, 2017) .
Today’s world-wide maritime policies are developed by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in 2018 - a United Nation’s specialized agency responsible for
regulating and governing shipping. The IMO works in partnerships with governments’
transportation directorates, and other institutions for numerous shipping facets. The
IMO, for example, developed the IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) which evolved to The International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code. The ISPS Code addresses a couple of cybersecurity concerns. For
example, the requirement that every ship develops a cyber-security plan every five
years.

Physical cyber-attacks
Cyberattacks and cyber-assisted attacks have now caused a sway in policy. Attackers
abusing automatic identification system (AIS) to target ships is the most significant
(Balduzzi, 2014). The IMO policies have become more stringent to the extent that they
allow the masters of ships to turn off their AIS if it is known to make them vulnerable
around piracy hotspots (International Maritime Organisation, 2011). While this policy
is in place, technology improvements have made it possible to make anonymous or
secure identity data instead of completely disabling the AIS. A good example of this
is the UK Department for Transportation that provided guidance for the physical
security with respect to piracy and other physical acts of violence against merchant
shipping (Department of Transport, 2011) .

Cyberattack enabled by physical action
Because ships work remotely, there is a high likelihood of misassumption by
management and stakeholders of the ship to be having reasonable cybersecurity.
However, that security reduces in contexts where physical attacks overwhelm overtake
on-ship physical security. Typical cyber hygiene for example deflects the connections
of USB devices on most ship systems (BIMCO, 2016). However, a well-designed
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policy adds flexibility without compromising security because devices require routine
software updates yet rules may be ignored in favour of convenient software updates.

Mitigation Cyber policy
At the moment in almost all ports, there are business continuity policies to ensure
operations after system failure. That notwithstanding, in the midst of a cyberattack, an
inefficient system is not necessarily broken and a fully functioning system does not
guarantee the provision of trustworthy data. On that account, operation and policies
catalogue should account for these likelihoods, in lieu of just taking the system as one
that is functional or non-functioning. It is important for one to understand this
difference cyber-attackers can obscure the difference thereby causing confusion at
both machine and human levels.

Prevention cyber policy
This segment describes the maritime cyber initiatives that can prevent cyber threats
serves to rebuff the general maritime cyber defence approaches. Some of these
proposed initiatives leverage previous sections e.g., cyber-physical security especially
given the growing technologies that intersect with ancient, entrenched security at the
physical level.
In thinking about future cyber-threats the researcher considers initiatives aimed at
stopping and mitigating maritime cyberattacks. In particular, the subtle cyber-attacks.
These are of interest for the near future in light of the evolution of maritime technology
towards remote and autonomous operation. In addition to physical security that can
be implemented at essential access points, there is need for policies for the interface
of ship systems with other entities such as USB and SCADA. Such policies improve
the capability of defending against continuous maritime cyberattacks. Such policies
can be developed from existing proposals for cyber-hygiene as well as adapt from
existing physical safety policies. This can be illustrated in cases where ships always
have navigation systems that are redundant such as SONAR or ECDIS (ECDIS:
Navigation in 2018, 2018).
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It should however be noted that it is paramount from the perspective of cybersecurity
that systems that are identical do not share same vulnerabilities owing to the risk of
failed protection against deliberate cyberattacks yet seemingly protecting against
accidents.
The IMO resolution A.1079 (28) insists that crews must be trained thoroughly and
adherence emphasized when conducting any training programs on policies related to
cyber awareness; ship interaction with systems ashore; segregation and clarification of
duties for specific OT and IT systems; and alert mechanisms for cyber incidents or
issues.

The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 62443 and 61508

standards require compliance with these standards in designing cyber-security alarms
in the context of the safety of ships and the controlling of ships. In addition, the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27000 document series require
that security policies for onshore management security alerts at office-level must be
aligned with ISO 27000
Considering existing standards of classification of system vulnerabilities cyberphysical, cyber vulnerabilities narrated in here allows for a more robust and effective
policy-assembling process in comparison with the previous cyber-hygiene reports
(NOSAC 2016) and (IET 2017).
In conclusion therefore, the maritime industry is clearly a late adopter in comparison
with other sectors when it comes to ship and shore infrastructure security, both of
which are critical national assets. The maritime industry should therefore embrace and
adopt new perspectives to regulation and training in the short to medium-term while
considering the setup of modern systems in the long term.

Cyber policy design,

additions and amendments are known to avert, mitigate and defend from undesired
cyberattacks and their related outcomes in the maritime world. These policies can
have a positive as well as significant bearing in present-day contexts in battling cyber
threats that are known and some that have not yet occurred.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1.

Introduction

To meet the objectives and address the research questions, a case study and a
qualitative research methodology was used owing to its ability to leverage and
investigate multiple disciplines and concepts. A qualitative research design
emphasizes meanings and processes that are not investigated with respect to amounts,
frequency or quantity. The researcher chose this methodology because it provides
insights into the maritime cybersecurity practices of two cases – Spain and Kenya – in
an attempt to understand the social and policy dimensions that distinguish developed
countries and developing countries in the implementation of maritime cybersecurity
practices. Qualitative research leverages a contextually responsive data collection and
case analysis approach thereby providing a holistic conceptualization of the research
questions/phenomena.
The researcher chose a qualitative design so that maritime cybersecurity practices can
be examined in their natural environment as well as with respect to what the research
subjects interpret their context to be (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The researcher
chooses a case study because it shall efficiently provide insights into how
cybersecurity is seen in practice in line with (Rashid, Rashid, Warraich, Sabir, &
Waseem, 2019) who argue that case studies are an efficient research approach in
answering research questions that require understanding of specific research
phenomenon and their practical manifestation. This allows a historical, technological,
social, economic and cultural investigation of the research questions as well as an
objective observation of the phenomena – in this case maritime cybersecurity practices
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015).
A case study provides for the investigation of one or more phenomena, and as
(Teegavarapu et al., 2009) argue, it can involve investigating a whole system or parts
of a system, an economy, a process, an organization or a structure.
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3.2.

Research Scope and Activities

Research Scope
The researcher limited the study to maritime cybersecurity in port operators and
shipping. Other sources of information shall include news, publications and journal
articles describing maritime cyberattacks and maritime cybersecurity.

Ex. 1. Study
Scope
definition and
expert
identification

Ex. 2. Online
and Desktop
Research

Ex. 3.
Questionnair
es and
Interview

Ex. 4. Data
Analysis

Ex. 5.
Review and
Validation

Figure 3.1: Research Activities
The study underwent the following exercises:
Exercise 1 - Study scope definition and identification of experts: step number one of
the study involved establishing the project scope and selection of experts on matters
of cybersecurity. Their input was captured and reflected upon in drafting of the
dissertation. These experts included port personnel and respective stakeholders
responsible for cybersecurity, state officials as well as other third parties/stakeholders.
Exercise 2 – Desk and Online research: In this phase/step, the researcher conducted a
search for recent, relevant literature in line with the study subject. The sources were
referenced and linked to other sections of the dissertation including the development
of good practices and recommendation.
Exercise 3 – A series of interviews using semi-structured questionnaires were carried
out with the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs): The questionnaires reflected maritime
cybersecurity components which were filled in by six maritime-ecosystem
stakeholders from Valencia and Mombasa Port Authorities. The respondents included
security, cybersecurity, OT and IT managers, as well as a representative of each study
country’s national ICT and cybersecurity agency).
Exercise 4 – Data analysis and report-writing: the data collected through online and
desk research and the subsequent interview responses were analysed. Findings were
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identified, documented and were used in drafting the dissertation as well as the
preparation of the final document.
Exercise 5 – Review and subsequent validation of the dissertation: This dissertation
was reviewed and underwent validation with maritime cybersecurity and other SMEs
by way of sharing of the draft dissertation as well as obtaining comments and feedback.

3.3.

Data Collection and Analysis

Data Collection
Data collection for this case study leveraged a variety of sources including:


Documents,

archives,

publications,

journals,

reports,

and,

research

literature/articles, news articles,


Participatory observation, and



Interviews

The case study shall use one or more of the above-mentioned data sources. Leveraging
on the flexibility of the use of various sources of information in a case study, the
researcher shall use data triangulation so as to get a comprehensive view of the
maritime cybersecurity practices in developed and developing states. This shall enable
the researcher to come up with credible and valid research results and findings
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014).
Data Analysis
Data analysis aimed at providing clarity on the research questions as well as identify
areas for further investigation. The data collected from the study was then
subsequently analyzed using Colaizzi’s 1978 framework for qualitative data analysis
where the data collected was coded into themes reflecting the research questions
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014) and analysed by comparing and formulating logical
perspectives. The researcher thereafter interpreted the results by debating them,
deriving logical conclusions and clarifying comparisons with research literature. In
this regard, the maritime cybersecurity practices of Spain and Kenya was compared in
order to establish the similarities and/or differences between them with regard to their
implementation.
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Figure 3.2: conceptual framework for systematic analysis of literature (Adapted from:
(Vom et al., 2009)
3.4.

Description of Colaizzi’s Framework for Qualitative Data Analysis

Colaizzi (1978) outlined a qualitative data analysis process with seven phases. This
analysis allows for alignment of the different phases with the raw data thereby
providing a brief and exhaustive description of study phenomena that is subsequently
validated by respondents that were used to generate this data (Morrow et al., 2015).
Qualitative data collection leverages first-hand, personal narratives of respondents’
experience. This can happen through in-person interviews (online or face-to-face),
written accounts of respondents’ experiences, reviewing personal blogs or using
research diaries. The stages are as shown below:
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Table 3.1: Colaizzi’s Framework for qualitative data analysis(Morrow et al., 2015)
Framework for Qualitative Data Analysis
Phase

Description

1. Familiarization

Researcher reads through all information from
respondents more than once, to familiarize oneself
with the data

2. Identification

of This involves identifying and taking note of key and

statements

are relevant statements in relation to the concepts or

that

significant

constructs under study

3. Formulation of meaning After careful reflection, the researcher attaches
meaning to the data. These meanings must be closely
aligned with the construct or concepts under study and
the experience of the respondents while at the same
time

eliminating

the

researcher’s

assumptions

(However, Colaizzi (1978) observed that complete
detachment from the context is impossible).
4. Clustering of data into This phase involves grouping of meanings identified
themes

by the researcher into cross-cutting themes as
reflected or represented across the responses. The
elimination of assumptions and presumptions by the
researcher enables avoidance of any influence of
theories already in place.

5. Develop

a A detailed description of the concept or construct is

comprehensive

developed in this phase.

description

themes identified in phase 4.

6. Develop

a

It should reflect all the

central By condensing the comprehensive description, the

message or structure

researcher is able to reflect and capture aspects that are
considered core to the structure of the concept or
construct.

7. Validation

A validation process involves taking the derived
central structure of the concept or construct back to the
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research respondents to see whether it adequately
reflects their experience. This process is iterative
(from the start to this phase) depending on the
feedback the researcher gets regarding the alignment
of the findings with the respondents’ perception of
adequate representation of their issue.
3.5.

Description of the McKinsey 7S Model

The McKinsey’s 7s model, developed in the 1980s and widely used by practitioners
and academics aims at emphasizing the human (or soft) skills in comparison with
infrastructure, equipment or capital. It remains popular as a strategic planning tool
and has been considered as an important driver of organizational performance
(Mindtools, 2020). The model demonstrates how 7 elements - Structure, Strategy,
Skills, Staff, Style, Systems, and Shared values – of organization, can be leveraged to
drive organizational effectiveness.
The McKinsey’s 7S model provides a robust framework for reflection on
organizational infrastructure, activities, and interactions.
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Figure 3.3: The McKinsey 7S Model
The following is the definitions of the elements:
Strategy–Describing the alignment of organizational resources and capabilities to
“succeed” in its operational environment.
Structure–A description of the structuring of the organization including reporting
relationships, role definitions, and descriptions of key responsibilities.
Systems–The technical and business -related infrastructure leveraged daily by staff to
deliver organizational performance.
Shared Values–The set of beliefs of the organization as described in expected traits,
behaviours or characteristics in addition to the organization’s vision and mission.
Style–The organizational leadership behaviour and cultural components.
Staff–The staffing plans, worker base, and talent management practices.
Skills–The existing staff ability to perform in the organization, which manifests in
organizational performance.

23

3.6.

The PESTEL Framework

PESTLE analysis model analyses the macro environmental factors that may
significantly impact organizational performance. PESTEL is derived from: Political,
Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal factors (Salem, 2018).
This model is used alongside another SWOT analysis tool that is used to document
threats and weaknesses, strengths and opportunities (Sheffield Hallam University,
2019). While this framework has been found helpful for start-ups or those making
entry into foreign markets, the PESTEL analysis tool works best when used alongside
other frameworks such as the SWOT analysis and McKinsey 7S model for a clear
comprehension and interpretation of internal and external organizational contextual
factors.

The PESTEL framework has over time been expanded to include

Demographics, Ethical, Intercultural, and Ecological factors thereby evolving with
acronyms like DESTEP and SLEPIT. In this dissertation, the researcher will simply
stick to PESTEL because it reflects the core factors in business. The PESTEL factors
are elaborated as below:
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Political

Legal

Environmental

Strategic
Plan

Economic

Social

Technological

Figure 3.4: The PESTEL Framework

Political Factors–This refers to the degree of government intervention within the
economy.
Economic Factors–presents a considerable footprint on how an organisation does
business, together with how flourishing they're.
Social Factors-This is usually mentioned as socio-cultural factors; it includes the
population’s shared belief and attitudes, together with – population growth, age
distribution, health consciousness, career attitudes and then far more.
Technological Factors–This is understood to have an effect on the flexibility of a
company to promote, build, and ship product and services.
Legal Factors–A number of legal factors can affect the ability of an organization to
operate.
Environmental Factors–There are industries that are sensitive to environmental
changes including maritime, tourism, agriculture, and farming. The issues here are;
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weather, climate change, and geographic location which might influence a company’s
business decisions

3.7.

Description of the SWOT Analysis Framework

SWOT is a short form for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.
Strengths (S) and Weaknesses (W) are the internal factors over which an organization
has a form of control while Opportunities (O) and Threats (T) are as external factors
over which an organization does not have complete control (Gürel, 2017). SWOT
Analysis has been used to analyze organizations’ strategic positions in the context of
it internal and external environment. It helps users identify the strategies that lead to
the development of a firm-specific business model at optimal alignment of resources
and capabilities (Tanya & David, 2015).

Environmental
Scanning

Internal Analysis

External Analysis

- Strengths

- Opportunities

- Weaknesses

- Threats

Figure 3.5: The SWOT Analysis Framework
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Below is the overview of the four factors (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and
Threats) –
Strengths - These are the qualities that enable us to accomplish the mission of the
organization.
Weaknesses – These are the qualities and characteristics that stop us from conquering
our mission and achieving our full potential. These factors dwindle influences on the
success and growth of the organization.
Opportunities - These are presented by the environment in which our organization
operates. They come about when an organization can reap the benefit of conditions in
its environment to execute and plan strategies that propels it to become more
successful.
Threats – These happens when conditions in the external environment ransacks the
dependability and success of the organization’s business. Threats cannot be controlled
and when they come, the steadiness and survival is placed at stake.
In summary therefore, SWOT Analysis is quintessential in the formulation and
selection of strategy. It is quite an excellent and powerful tool, however, it pertains a
great subjective element. For maximum benefit, the tool is better used as a guide, and
not as a prescription.
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CHAPTER 4. MARITIME CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTATION IN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
4.1.

International Maritime Cybersecurity Perspective

Globally, by 2002, the International Ships and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS)
had been embedded into the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention. It was aimed
at identifying the marine security-related roles of port facilities and articulating their
compliance obligations.
This ISPS Code necessitates the planning of a Port Facility Security Assessment by
ports by determining major assets, possible threats and countermeasures. This, in
addition to a Port Facility Security Plan that outlines measures, actions and
assumptions made in ensuring port security. The PFSA is expected to take into
consideration procedural policies, physical security, systems that protect personnel,
structural integrity, telecommunication and radio systems, computer networks/
systems as well as critical marine transport substructures. In addition, the PFSP should
be able to cover access to the port facility, restricted areas’ management, freight
handling, ship’s stores delivery and port facility security observation.
The Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL17) and SOLAS resolutions
outline how information exchange between ports and third parties should be carried
out. This exchange, described in nine different but consistent approaches has been
mandatory since April, 2019. The standardization of data exchange has impacted the
ports’ IT ecosystems thereby introducing additional IT security challenges. This is
because Cybersecurity in maritime systems, specifically ships only garnered
International focus from about 2017 yet being manifested through recommendations
at a global level on how maritime systems should be secured.
Maritime Cyber-risk management has been articulated in IMO guidelines by The
International Maritime Organization Facilitation Committee and the Maritime
Security Committee in the MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 19 with the call for increased cyber risk
awareness as well as key maritime cyber risk management recommendations ranging
from current to future cyber risks.

The guidelines articulate and distinguish

Information Technology and Operational Technology systems.
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4.2.

Maritime Cybersecurity in Europe Vs. Africa
4.2.1. Spanish (EU) Maritime Cybersecurity Policy Overview

EU regulation affected the organization of the maritime ecosystem, subsequently
affecting ports in the areas of security, safety, and data exchange.
The EU can be argued to have adopted and utilized some components of the SOLAS
Convention in a number of related rules and regulations (EC) 725/2004 (NIST, 2018).
For example, one that focuses on enhancing the safety of ship and port facility and the
implementation of the Code of International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS).
On the other hand, the Directive 2005/65/EC(European Union, 2005) focuses on
enhancing port security while Regulation (EC) 336/2006 dwells on the International
Safety Management Code (ISM) implementation among the European Union maritime
sector. Nonetheless, the philosophy code isn't applicable to ports.

Directive

2010/65/EU (European Union, 2010) requires Member States’ ports to utilize
standardized forms in order to ease traffic. This directive additionally requires that
SafeSeaNet systems be established at country and global level thus to facilitate secure
exchange of knowledge between maritime authorities of Member States and
alternative authorities’ systems like customs systems. Directive 2005/65/EC and
Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 are the noted legal frameworks that support security
plans and risk assessments for ports and their respective facilities. In implementing
this directive, the Member States are expected to draft a PFSA while the Port
Authorities concurrently set up their PFSP such that approval is attained prior to
implementation by the Member States, who are responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the PFSPs.
The European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) was developed in 2014 and
subsequently revised in 2018 by the European Union. It is a shared and comprehensive
tool to monitor and respond to the protection of activities of the individuals and assets
of the maritime system. For ports, the revision of the EUMSS, that was consequently
adopted by the overall Affairs Council on 26 June 2018, aimed at centralizing coverage
to boost awareness and healthier follow-up to the policy and strategy. In addition, the
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, referred to as the general data Protection Regulation
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(GDPR) – introduced in 2016, which covers the protection of privacy in light of the
movement of information. The GDPR details necessities for private information
protection and applies to all essential sectors including the maritime sector.
Essential services Operators known within the system of water transport as described
by the EU include the following:
Inland, ocean and coastal travellers and freight water transport corporations as outlined
in Appendix I of Regulation (EC) 725/2004. It however, does not cover the specific
vessels operated by those companies;
Management of ports: includes “any gazetted space of land and water, with boundaries
outlined by the Member State within which the port is set, containing works and
equipment designed to facilitate industrial maritime transport operations” as per
Directive 2005/65/EC. This includes port facilities as well as equipment and works
operators in the ports.
The EU Cybersecurity Act was established in 2019 to strengthen the position of
ENISA within matters of cybersecurity for the member states of EU. It defines
certification framework for cybersecurity covering ICT product, services and
processes for the EU bloc. This framework provides for a set of standards, rules,
technical necessities, and procedures ensuring that ICT services and products are
reliable reflect the needs of the EU.

4.2.2. African Maritime Cybersecurity Policy Overview
According to (Reva, 2020), the future development objectives of Africa assume fully
operational ports and shipping sectors with no clear articulation of the cybersecurity
component. This unfortunately leaves them open to cyber breaches and disruptions.
Whereas cybersecurity in Africa is gradually becoming acknowledged as an essential
element of maritime security, its incorporation into African maritime security
apparatuses and frameworks is not being accelerated, which is not. However, these
sectors are currently being faced by a number of challenges connected to efficiency
and effectiveness, including their repeated transformation and innovation is dire if the
socio-economic needs of Africa are to be served.
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Given that cybersecurity is not specific to one country, this gives the African Union
(AU) a leading role to facilitate member state’s maritime security capabilities. In
2014, the African Union made a positive start by adopting the Malabo Convention Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection and the organization also
incorporated cybersecurity as a leading initiative in its Agenda 2063 plan.
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) argues that cybersecurity is rapidly becoming
an important chunk of the maritime security needs of Africa, therefore requires shared
action from African states given the rapid digitalisation that will make Africa’s
maritime infrastructure a high-risk target.
This hard work will not yet be sufficient to defend Africa from the varieties of
maritime cyber-attacks that is continuously being reported in other parts of the globe.
There was a prominent occurrence when the ICT systems of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) were attacked, rendering the IMO's website unusable and totally
shut down for two days but no serious impairment was stated.

4.3.

Implementation of Maritime cybersecurity: Best Practices

Globally, the increasing digitalisation has led to new policies and laws that require
ports to deal with new challenges brought about by ICTs. Ports’ reliance on novel
technologies for increased competitiveness, are expected to observe some standards
and policies as they enhance operations. As a results of this, new stakes and challenges
in cybersecurity arises, each within the information Technologies (IT) and Operation
Technologies (OT) worlds.
The implementation of policies and standards permits the identification of measures
that ports will then enact to better shield themselves from cyberattacks. A number of
known measures are outlined in the contexts that follow. They are meant to function
as sensible practices for individuals like CISOs and CIOs that are in charge of the
implementation of cybersecurity in Port Authorities and Terminal Operators.
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4.3.1. Port of Mombasa (Kenya)
The Kenyan government has brought in a number of steps in trying to solve the
increasing cyber threat. The National cybersecurity strategy of Kenya, developed by
Kenya’s Ministry of Information, Communications, and Technology in 2014,
comprises four primary objectives. Number one - to protect “critical information
infrastructure.” Number two - to promote awareness of cybersecurity by “informing
and educating the Kenyan public and workforce.” Number Three - to set up a
cybersecurity framework that nurtures collaboration and reduces “duplication of
effort.” And lastly - to make sure the strategy is effectively implemented to the letter
and updated to adapt to the evolving threat environment. Additionally, in 2017, Kenya
established the National Cyber Command Center also known as known as NC3 to
forefront and coordinate national efforts to cybersecurity. The NC3 works with public
– private and not-for profit partnerships.

4.3.2. Port of Valencia (Spain)
The port of Valencia has a robust cyber security governance framework at port level
that incorporates all port operations’ stakeholders. These stakeholders include Port
Authority, port operators, pilotage company and shipping corporations.
It is critical that all the stakeholders concerned with matters of cybersecurity are
engaged and are willing to participate in the worldwide port operation security. The
port of Valencia is taking varied steps therefore to raise its cybersecurity including:
Raising awareness regarding port-level cybersecurity, developing a culture of
cybersecurity. While the port is traditionally meticulous when it comes to safety and
security matters, it seems cybersecurity has not been absolutely assimilated within the
minds of stakeholders. This step is combined with coaching could therefore, guarantee
a shared understanding of cybersecurity and the potential to use it in daily processes.
Enforcement of cybersecurity measures includes segregation of network, countersign
hardening, updates management, segregation of rights among others. Within the space
of OT involving legacy systems that cannot be updated in most cases, network
segregation and countersign protection are crucial to ensure an optimum level of
cybersecurity.
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The port considers security intentionally in applications, most notably because the port
utilizes variety of systems whereby some are accessible to third parties for information
exchange which can cause compromise of the port systems if there is any vulnerability.
Enforcement of early detection and timely response capabilities at port level mitigate
in real time any cyberattack before it affects the operation, safety and security of the
port. The port depends on simple measures of detection like alerts once a particular
action is completed.
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND SPAIN
5.1. Cybersecurity Implementation at Mombasa Port
5.1.1. Overview of Mombasa Port
Mombasa port is notably of the oldest harbours in Africa. It dates back as early because
the eighteenth century. The port is found on the lineation of Republic of Kenya and it
serves a big rural area of nearly 250 million individuals comprehensive of from
Republic of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi, Republic of Congo,
Northern jap Democratic, South Sudan, and African nation. Mombasa port is managed
by Republic of Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) that could be a state corporation whose
major goal is to facilitate and improve maritime trade by providing competitive
services. The port has 2 instrumentality terminals that is; the Mombasa instrumentality
terminal and therefore the Kipevu instrumentality terminal, that has created the port to
register noteworthy growth in volumes of traffic over the past decade. The annual
loading turnout has been increasing by 6.9% and therefore the instrumentality traffic
mounting by 9.3%, as noted by the ports authority (Kenya Port Authority, 2015).
Figure 6.1 provides an outline of the map of the port of Mombasa showing the road
connections to the enclosed port space, the berths, and put in beacons & buoys.
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Figure 5.1: The overview map of Mombasa Port, Africa ports(Trevor, 2021).

5.1.2. Cyber Risk and Threat Management at Mombasa Port

General Cybersecurity risk and threat mitigation practices at Mombasa Port
Mombasa Port Employees
Senior leaders and Risk Officers at Mombasa port are taking time to define what their
desired (Cybersecurity) risk culture should look like and what steps they can take to
promote and maintain this at all levels of the port although this seems to take forever.
However, the focus is found to be solely a "tone from the top" attitude instead of an
inclusive embedding of values and daily behaviours at all levels and strategy. Many
port employees including risk officers interviewed seem to acknowledge the slow and
inconsistent steps taken to address this risk as noted by respondent #MOM05—"while
progress has been made by this port, embedding cybersecurity risk culture throughout
the port still remain a key challenge for many years to come". He was defensive by
saying — "cultural change however does not happen overnight." Respondent
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#MOM03 added to this by noting— “I have never heard or seen the CEO or CRO
communicate the importance of Cybersecurity risk management and instil a risk
management culture at all levels of the port”. Cybersecurity risk management is not
embedded into all spheres of the port.
The port uses incident investigation, auditing, and Internal Communication and
Periodical Reports in identifying Cybersecurity risk. From this view, it can be noted
that the port leaves behind very important Cybersecurity risk identification approaches
including Industry Benchmarking, risk survey, Inspection by the port risk staff,
Incident investigation, and brainstorming. The port also uses strategies such as
Business Impact and Threat Analysis, SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities,
Threats) Analysis, and Business Continuity Planning to analyse risk. This is however
known not to be comprehensive enough to make a summative risk analysis. Important
strategies such as PESTLE, BPEST and Research and development is left out.
The port is also establishing a fairly better internal controls and documentation in the
area of Cybersecurity risk management although it is not enough:
From now on, we are focusing not only in continuing to improve our ability to
manage Cybersecurity risk but also more importantly, we are trying to improve
our capacity that can demonstrate our efficiency in Cybersecurity risk
management by way of documentation and reporting... we are setting
parameters to achieve that as we speak. ——Respondent #MOM01
The port reports of using a handful of measures to identify Cybersecurity risks
including; internal communication, periodical reports, general risk reports,
Cybersecurity systems auditing, and incident investigation.

The port also uses

methods like market survey, business impact and threat analysis, and Business
Continuity Planning to make Cybersecurity risk analysis.
The port reports of planning to spend a reasonable amount in their budget towards
digital transformation. According to one executive, Respondent #MOM05 “we intend
to invest a mouth-watering amount towards technology in our 5-year plan beginning
2021/22. This shall include investments in the latest hardware and innovative maritime
products-both hardware and software.” Asked to clarify what amount or what
percentage of the yearly investment budget this will take, he quickly responded “the
details are not yet available as I speak but will be … in a few weeks.”
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Digitization of core business functions and processes is being taken by the port
including the digitization of sales and marketing, human resources, IT/OT, etc.
However, there is limited and less efficient risk management information systems in
place and yet the standard goes ‘as ports digitize, so must risk’ because it is becoming
increasingly common that ports are no longer “owning” the client interface because of
digitization. There is a strategic plan on increasing spending a high amount on
digitization of business processes and functions in the next few years even though
specifics were not delved into.
Although the "culture at the top" at the port shows support for Cybersecurity risk
management through policy documentations, senior management is found to be less
informed and concerned about Cybersecurity risks and mitigating controls as noted by
one Respondent #MOM09:
All through board meeting of which I sometimes attend, when the issue of
technology and Cybersecurity related risks are brought up, there is little
support or concern for it. This makes me to always tend to keep the issues down
to my department and not bring it up to the top guys inform of email, memo or
whenever there is a meeting.
Cyber Systems risk and threat mitigation practices at Mombasa Port
Mombasa port now, more than ever, rely on IT/OT to spur growth by identifying
opportunities. For IT/OT systems to play a pivotal role in business transformation and
growth in the industry, proactive IT/OT systems risk management approach need to
be practiced. IT/OT systems risk management, as a part of operational risk
management in a port need to revolve around seeking answers to some pertinent issues
relevant to the port. This sub-chapter presents the various approaches being taken by
Mombasa port in managing IT/OT systems threat and risk.
Mombasa port Employees
Backups at the port are used for complete IT/OT system restoration. Backups are also
extended to saving more than just digital data. Backup processes include the backup
of IT/OT system specifications and configurations, policies and procedures,
equipment, and data centres. Back up is always done by the Database Admin or System
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Admin. The port however, is not using alternatives to traditional backups, such as
redundant systems and cloud services. One situation that was explained by Respondent
#MOM08 was that "There was a backup that was not good, another situation, the
backup media was damaged, and we could not easily fix the problem." Just having a
backup procedure in place does not always offer adequate protection, he concludes.
Security Organization: The port maintains a fairly safe circle of IT/OT security
practices. These include; User Authentication-all employees within and without a port
uses one or a combination of the following; Something he/she knows (a password or
PIN), Something he/she has (a card or token), Something he/she is (a unique physical
characteristic). According to the researcher’s experience, not all the employees are
availed with a combination of these security elements. Respondent #MOM08 concurs
“I have a secret password for some systems but not a card or biometrics for accessing
even basic rooms at the port.” All security complaints and problems are reported to the
ICT manager and then to the CIO.
Application Security: The port employs both network and computer-based control of
applications. Respondent #MOM09 had this to say:
we do control applications on the network, by allowing or denying the network
connections required for the applications to communicate. We also control the
computers on which the applications including Cybersecurity application run,
by restricting which applications can be run on computers and we control what
functions each application is allowed to perform through policy templates.
Network Security: The port uses a combination of security mechanisms to secure its
network including using routers and switches to increase the security of the network,
Virtual Private Networks (VPN), unified threat management platforms (firewalls
combined with network antivirus, web filtering, IPsec, and other network-oriented
security functions). The port however does not perform application network
communication control, advanced wireless network hardening practices and this is
found to be a serious security concern. The port also presents shaky security practices
for Voice over IP (VoIP) infrastructure.
Physical Security: The port carries out a number of measures to ensure the physical
security of IT/OT infrastructure including; classification of assets which is the process
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of identifying physical assets and assigning criticality and value to them in order to
develop concise controls and procedures that protect them effectively, building access
control systems, mantraps at the entrance (an area designed to allow only one
authorized individual entrance at any given time), locks, bugler-proof doors and file
cabinets, laptop locks and docking stations, controlled access to data centres, wiring
closets, and network rooms, building and employee IDs, biometrics, security guards,
physical intrusion detection (for example. Closed-Circuit Television-CCTV, alarms).
The port is integrating old legacy systems with modern solutions in an endeavour
to modernize their systems. This however, has been a huge hassle for the port in the
process of seeking to improve Cybersecurity.
Legacy hardware here is a difficult issue to handle. They are cumbersome,
unruly, and challenging to update and manage. Most of the outdated
infrastructure at the port are struggling to keep up with the demands of modern
solutions, creating a bottleneck for Cybersecurity processes and operating
capacity —— Respondent #MOM05
One of the challenges is that some of the modern cloud and other SaaS solutions are
incompatible with the older legacy systems. This means that in order for the systems
administrator incorporate new tools and programs, extensive custom code is required
to make it work. This has resulted to the emergence of data silos at the port, whereby
different departments across the port cannot freely access the data they need.

Maritime Industry Practitioners
Mombasa port functions in an ever changing operating setting characterised by rising
prospects from the customer with an ever changing landscape of the economy,
enlarged scope and strength of regulations for industry. It is leveraging less of
technological innovation geared towards IT/OT systems risk management, while at the
same time staying less vigilant against evolving IT/OT systems risks.
While the count of remote incidents of one-time failures in Cybersecurity has
come greatly reduced, active IT/OT risk management at the port has tripped.
This setback is majorly attributed to insufficient Cybersecurity risk
information and a reactive rather than pro-active IT/OT risk culture.
Respondent #MOM02
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5.1.3. SWOT analysis for cybersecurity strategy implementation at Mombasa
Port
This sub-chapter is a SWOT analysis of the Mombasa Port which will later specify
strategies that the port should implement to make it cyber secure and competitive. This
SWOT analysis is a method of reviewing the current cybersecurity mission of the port
as well as defining a new one. The aims at examining the strengths and weaknesses
related to the internal review of the port as well as the opportunities and threats to
review the external environment of the port.
Table 6.1: SWOT analysis for cybersecurity strategy implementation at Mombasa Port
Cybersecurity Strategy Mombasa Port
Implementation

INTERNAL
STRENGTHS (+)
1. Easter Africa Trade
route
2. Biggest port - container
capacity in East Africa
3. Favorable dwell time as
compared to other ports
in Africa
4. Well established port
infrastructure
5. Good port productivity
6. The port is favored by
both cargo owners and
shippers
7. Good road and rail
connections
8. Close proximity to
manufacturing bases
9. Although
Mombasa
port has problems in
regard
to
modern
equipment and their
availability, the turn

FACTORS
WEAKNESSES (–)
1. The port is highly
congested
2. The roads to the
hinterland is highly
congested
3. There is very poor
Utilization of rail at
the port
4. Prices at the port is
so high
5. Less IT and OT
Infrastructure
compared
to
international ports
6. Mombasa port is
restricted in its
activities because it
is
government
owned.
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round time for vessels is
very promising and
competitive compared
to other ports in Africa
10.
Mombasa port has
very good financial
returns.
OPPORTUNITIES (+)

1.Presence of Mombasa
dig-out port
2.Presence of support
services for East Africa
oil and gas reserves
3.Increase in the transit of
EXTERNAL
bulk commodities along
FACTORS
the corridor
4.The hub port of the East
African
Community
region
5.Development of the dry
ports in Kenya, Uganda,
and Rwanda
6.Freight and logistics cost
reduction
through
improved productivity
and efficiency

THREATS (–)

STRENGTHS (+) /
OPPORTUNITIES (+)
STRATEGY
Provision of strategic,
tactical and operational
measurements in focus of
the systems perspective;
Product and Service
development; Provision of
value-added services for
cargo and vessels for
reduced costs for vessels
and
cargo;
Business
Requirements Analysis;
Downsizing
and/or
specialising leading to
market focus and cost
reduction; Creation of
Alliances
and
Partnerships.

STRENGTHS
THREATS
STRATEGY

WEAKNESSES (–) /
OPPORTUNITIES
(+) STRATEGY
Open and Integrative
Organization
structure; Free Port
Status for Free Trade
Zone for market
focus, Reduced Cargo
Costs;
Upgrading
labour
skills
to
increase
efficiency
and capacity;
Reduction in labour
requirements
to
increase in efficiency;
Provision
of
multidisciplinary
skills;
Enhance
managerial skills in
leveraging resources
and
translating
strategic intent into
actions for work
groups;
Creating
learning environment
by providing time,
space and resources,
visibly
recognize
success.
(+) / WEAKNESSES (–) /
(–) THREATS
(–)
STRATEGY
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1.Competition from other
east and southern African
ports such as Durban
(South
Africa),
Bagamoyo (Tanzania),
Techbanine
(Mazambique)
2.Economic slowdown of
the
East
African
Economies
especially
due to COVID-19

Additional
sites
of
Cybersecurity
Infrastructure to increase
capacity and location.
Management
Reorganisation for overall
efficiency
to
reduce
operating costs; Closely
integrated research and
development.

Development of new
facilities to Increase
in
efficiency,
throughput
and
capacity; Acquisition
of new equipment;
Development
of
systems
including
control
systems,
recruitment
and
selection
systems,
innovation
management
information systems,
competitor analysis,
Appraisal,
training
and
development
systems,
and
recognitions systems.

Upgrading of the general port infrastructure including the IT and OT infrastructure
which provides access to other ports has augmented attractiveness of the port for
investors as well as maritime and land carriers. A much higher growth in handling
performed by the port in comparison to what was anticipated in the diagnostic
documentation on which Transport Development Strategy is founded approves that
the position of the ports in the African port market is strong. Even though the port has
glitches in relation to modern infrastructure and their availability, the despatch time
for vessels is very encouraging and viable in relation to other African ports.
Opportunities are potential areas in which the port can identify potential growth,
profits and market share and for Mombasa port it includes new lines of business in
developing markets. There is growth of international trade which has opened up
business opportunities for the port to open new lines of business in markets in
developing countries whose booming economies demand more and more products of
a high level and price including technological products. Additionally, digitalization
makes it possible to manage goods and passengers more efficiently, leading to the
transportation of more volume together, preferential of the scale factor, thereby
improving competition.
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5.1.4. GAP Analysis: McKinsey 7-S Framework and PESTEL.
The McKinsey framework is founded on the basis that a port consists of seven critical
facets. The study sought to analyse and establish the cybersecurity strategy
implementation of Mombasa port and that it has yielded to the concept in order to
realize their objectives. The results are presented in the Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Mombasa Port Cybersecurity Strategy Analysis using the McKinsey 7s
Framework
McKinsey 7S Framework

Complies
Yes [05]

No [0.0]

STRATEGY


Involvement

in

the

cybersecurity

N

strategy

formulation


Simple, clear, and easily understood cybersecurity Y
strategies



N

Concise cybersecurity implementation stages and
timeline



N

The cybersecurity strategy is compatible with the
port’s vision and mission

Average Score

05/20

STRUCTURE


Clear integration and coordination mechanisms



Job allocation and authority to do the cybersecurity Y

Y

related jobs


Simple organization structure of the port



Decentralized decision making process

Average Score

Y
N
15/20

SYSTEM


Availability of measurement and control mechanisms for

N

cybersecurity strategy implementation
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IT and OT systems to assist in cybersecurity strategy Y
implementation



N

Monitoring the effectiveness of Cybersecurity strategy
implementation



N

An open system: free flow of information between the
departments/branches within the port

Average Score

05/20

STAFF


N

Sufficient number of employees to facilitate the
Cybersecurity implementation process



N

Level of education and experience of staff especially in
IT/OT/Cybersecurity operation



N

Availability of multi-disciplinary team involved in the
Cybersecurity strategy implementation



Good working relationship within members of the Y
IT/OT/Cybersecurity team

Average Score

05/20

STYLE


N

Support of key groups and other professionals connected
to Cybersecurity



Positive attitude of leadership towards the Cybersecurity Y
strategy being implemented



in

N

Leadership style allows those involved in Cybersecurity

N

Sufficient

support

from

Top

management

cybersecurity strategy implementation


strategy implementation to participate freely
Average Score

05/20

SKILLS


Efficient and sufficient feedback mechanisms

Y
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N

Availability of relevant IT/OT/Cybersecurity skills and
competences within the staff



N

Availability and allocation of financial resources
towards cybersecurity strategy implementation



N

Availability of sufficient ways of developing skills in
IT/OT/Cybersecurity

Average Score

05/20

SHARED VALUES


Employees’ belief in the vision and mission of the Y
organization



The organization’s culture and ability to change



Employee’s awareness of the Cybersecurity strategy

Y
N

being implemented


N

The Cybersecurity strategy is supported by the
prevailing local/ national culture

Average Score

10/20

Overall Score

50/140

The results in Table 5.2 implies that the interviewees concur that simple, clear, and
easily understood cybersecurity strategies lead to the success of the process of
implementing the strategy, but the rank is quite low in the component of strategy with
a 05/20. There is also IT and OT systems to assist in cybersecurity strategy
implementation. However, they noted that cybersecurity implementation stages and
timeline is ambiguous and complex. There is also a lack of measurement and control
mechanisms for cybersecurity strategy implementation. In addition, the respondents
indicated that the level of education and experience of staff especially in
IT/OT/Cybersecurity operation is still wanting (represented by 05/20 in the staff
component) and there is a lack of availability of sufficient ways of developing skills
in IT/OT/Cybersecurity.
The findings showed most of the respondents indicated that there was Positive attitude
of leadership towards the cybersecurity strategy being implemented but with
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insufficient support from top management in cybersecurity strategy implementation
(represented by 05/20 in the style component). What is important is that the employees
believe in the vision and mission of the organization.
Table 5.3: Kenya/Mombasa Port Analysis using the PESTEL Framework
PESTEL Framework

Aligned
Yes [05]

No [0.0]

POLITICAL FACTORS


Government stability/instability

Y



Corruption in Government

Y



Favorable Tax policies



Government regulation and deregulation



Appropriate (cyber) defense expenditures



Warm bilateral relationships



Import-export regulation/restrictions



Trade control



Appropriate size of government budgets

Average Score

N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
25/45

ECONOMIC FACTORS


Favorable growth rate



Federal government budget deficits

N



Low unemployment trend

N



Stock market trends

N



Exchange rate

Average Score

Y

Y
10/25

SOCIAL FACTORS


Population size and growth rate



Attitudes towards foreign people

Y



Appropriate Education level

Y



Attitude towards work

Y

N
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Wealth distribution

N



Per capita income

N



Average disposable income

N



Attitude towards government

N

Average Score

15/40

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS


Technology incentives

N



Automation

N



R&D activity

N



Technological change

N



Access to new technology

N



Level of innovation

N



Technological awareness

Y



Internet infrastructure

Y



Communication infrastructure

Y



Life cycle of technology

Average Score

N
15/50

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS


Weather

Y



Climate

Y



Environmental policies

N



Climate change

N



Pressures from NGO’s

N



Natural disasters

N



Air and water pollution



Recycling standards

N



Attitudes towards green products

N



Support for renewable energy

N

Average Score

Y

15/50

LEGAL FACTORS

47



Discrimination laws

N



Antitrust laws

N



Employment laws



Consumer protection laws



Copyright and patent laws



Health and safety laws



Education laws



Consumer protection laws

N



Data protection laws

N

Y
N
Y
N
Y

Average Score

15/45

Overall Score

95/255

Kenya as a country is known to be politically stable with favorable Tax policies and
growth rate, and warm bilateral relationships (The World Bank, 2021), however there
is rampant corruption in Government, high rate of unemployment and low trade
control (scoring a 25/45 in the political factors component). The study also noted that
the country has got high population size and growth rate with poor wealth distribution.
The average disposable income and income per head is also low, scoring a 15/40 in
the social factors component. Kenya and Mombasa port in particular fares poorly in
the technology factors. Technology incentives, Automation, R&D activity is either
nonexistent or very poor, Very low level of innovation and access to new technology.
However, the level of technological awareness is fair with fair internet and
communication infrastructure (scoring a 15/50 in the technological factors
component).
Kenya is also endowed with excellent climate and weather but with poor
environmental policies, recycling standards and limited support for renewable energy
subsequently scoring 15/50 on the environmental factors component. The country is
also known, according to the study for not discrimination, antitrust laws but with
limited consumer and data protection laws, scoring 15/45 on the legal factors
component.
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5.2. Cybersecurity Implementation at Valencia Port
5.2.1. Overview of Valencia Port
The Port Authority of Valencia, popularly known and trading under the name of
Valenciaport, is the national body accountable for running and management of three
state-owned ports along an 80km stretch of the Mediterranean coast in Eastern Spain:
Valencia, Sagunto and Gandía.
The port of Valencia is the first and last port of call for regular shipping lines operating
in the Western Mediterranean. As a hub for the entire Western Mediterranean, the port
professionally distributes goods over a radius of 2,000km, both in southern EU
countries and in North Africa, representative of a huge market of 270 million
consumers. The port is highly specialized in the traffic of containerized produce that
also attends to other traffics including liquid and solid bulk and ro-ro cargo. The port
also manages consistent passenger and merchandise traffic with the Balearic Islands,
and receives a large number of cruise ships yearly in its facilities.
Approximately the most significant figures in 2019 for the port of Valencia were
around 81 million tonnes of total traffic; 7900 calls vessel; five and a half million of
containers (TEU); 1.113.000 passengers and 723.000 vehicles.
With respect to container throughput in 2019 was the fifth port of Europe, the second
of the Mediterranean and the first of Spain (Data Ports, 2021). The PAV, as well as
other port authorities in Kingdom of Spain, reports to the Ministry of Transportes,
Movilidad Agenda town and is ruled by Spanish Legislative Royal Decree 2/2011 of
five Gregorian calendar month underneath that the recast text of the Spanish Law on
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State-Owned Ports and the Merchant Navy was passed (Valenciaport. 2021)

Figure 5.2: Map of Port of Valencia. Maps Valencia. (2021, 08).

5.2.2. Cyber Risk and Threat Management at the Port of Valencia
According to #VAL05, the port addresses 3 key classes of activities:
Maritime shipment connected activities which has general shipment, container, liquid
or dry bulk in addition to dedicated infrastructure and services to manage connected
operations and welcoming shipment vessels together with unloading and loading,
storage, customs scrutiny, and sanitary controls.
Passengers and vehicles transport connected activities laced with dedicated
infrastructure and services to welcome vehicles and passengers on ships and manager
connected operations like parking, traveler gangways, bars and restaurants, and border
management.
Fishing connected activities involving dedicated infrastructure and services to manage
and welcome fishing boats and connected operations like fish scrutiny, fish
unloading/loading, and fish cold storage.
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In an effort to support these varied activities, the Port of Valencia provides main
services as portrayed within the Figure 6.: Main services, Activities and Infrastructure
at Port of Valencia, (Port du Valencia, 2019). These services and activities area unit
assembled into seven classes, and were consequently outline supported through the
desktop analysis and knowledge provided by the respondents who contributed to the
study.

Figure 5.3: Main Services, Activities and Infrastructure at Port of Valencia, (Port du
Valencia, 2019)
Some of the cybersecurity risk and threat management approaches at the port of
Valencia is detailed below:
Security Operations Management: This is the on-the-ground process by which security
incidents at the port are managed, security controls are implemented and maintained,
and people with a higher level of access to IT/OT systems and data are subject to
oversight. They include: 1) Communication and Reporting; The port's ICT manager
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and his team provides management with measurements of success through metrics and
key performance indicators (KPIs). Respondent #VAL08 notes that "some of the
reports and communication we make to management includes the number of antivirus
installations that are complete and up to date and the number of attacks blocked by a
firewall in a given period of time". 2) Change Management; The port has got a change
management plan in place but in it lacks important components like a change
management system and change advisory board (CAB) as advised by international
standards like ITIL.
Business Continuity Planning (BCP): On BCP at the port, in order to figure out how
IT/OT systems can resume normal operations during a disaster, the business continuity
officers are, as reported, works with each business unit at the port as closely as
possible. They meet with the people who make the decisions (management), the people
who carry out the decisions in IT/OT systems management team, and finally the
“worker bees (IT/OT front line staff)” who actually do the work.
Disaster Recovery (DR): On DR, the port works with IT/OT subject matter experts
(SMEs), to figure out a way to bypass for example a particular electronic feed or file
dependency that may be needed to continue the recovery of a Cybersecurity system.
The responsible business continuity or disaster recovery professional works with the
IT/OT department and the Cybersecurity unit to achieve one purpose—to operate a
fine, productive, and lucrative port. The test involving a Cybersecurity system occurs
every 3 months and all the documentation and results from it backed up. Respondent
#VAL03 explains:
We as a port come to know who and what is being recovered by gathering
experts together, such as the programmer, business analyst, system architect,
or any other SME that is necessary. These experts are invaluable when it comes
to creating our DR plan. They are the people who know what it takes to
technically run the IT/OT systems in question and they always explain why a
certain disaster recovery process will cost a certain amount. This information
is important for the CIO/ICT manager of the port, so that she or he can make
informed decisions.
Talent and Training: The port employs a reasonable number of talented IS/IT
employees with an average of 5-10 years of work experience. However, the IT/OT
department at the port is suffering from gaps in critical skills areas such as
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cybersecurity, cloud computing and DevOps. IT professionals who have been offered
professional development opportunities are struggling to keep up. The blame is always
on the rate of technological change which is outpacing training at the port as
Respondent #VAL06 noted “We are lacking a culture of continuous learning, team
member development, and talent pipeline development in this fast changing lane of
technology and financial technology for that matter”.
Database Security: The port relies heavily on the information stored in their database
systems. From Cybersecurity business transactions to human resources records, and
Cybersecurity mission-critical, sensitive data is tracked within these systems. Many of
the security-related best practices have been deployed by the port to secure database
systems including network-level security, physical security, and using server-related
best practices. However, there are additional considerations that should be taken into
account when securing databases. They include operating system security, using
application security, and database auditing, among others and these are found to be
wanting at the port.
Computer Security: The port is using best practices to secure both Windows and Unix
systems alike as described by Respondent #VAL04:
we are doing our best to reduce the attack surfaces, run security software and
antiviruses, apply vendor security updates, perform strong authentication, and
control administrator privileges. However, out of the box, Windows contains
many vulnerabilities that leave it open to attack, but we are trying our best to
reduce those vulnerabilities in a number of ways. Whether a server or a
workstation, the approach is the same.
What seems to be missing is that the port is failing to separate these systems based on
risk which is very important.
5.2.3. SWOT analysis for cybersecurity strategy implementation at Port of
Valencia Port
This should be noted that the reasons for this analysis/assessment is to determine the
strengths and weaknesses of the Port of Valencia so as to utilize the strengths and
reduce the weaknesses. The strengths shall be exploited while the weaknesses are
reduced. The factors that are covered by this evaluation are listed in Table 5.4 below:
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Table 5.4: SWOT analysis for cybersecurity strategy implementation at Valencia Port
Cybersecurity Strategy Port of Valencia
Implementation

INTERNAL

FACTORS

STRENGTHS (+)

WEAKNESSES (–)

1. Decarbonization
of
policy of the port
2. The Open Data Policy
of EU Ports
3. Increased
state
investment in ports
4. Well-developed port
community
5. The management of
the port has highly
qualified staff, trained
in
the
maritime
industry.
6. Multipurpose nature of
Port of Valencia
7. Advanced
logistics
practices and high
solution capacity
8. Reduced
cost
of
operation
and
maintenance
9. Increased safety of the
port compared to other
EU ports
10. Highly
developed
technological
infrastructure
that
provides
favorable
conditions
for
development of the
production function in
relation
cargo
handling, production
and processing.

1. Vulnerabilities
errors
such
as
security
and
integrity of the port
in achieving the
Industry
4.0
concept
2. High
costs
of
development and
implementation of
new technologies
3. Human
capital:
Manual workers are
under the direct
influence of process
automation inherent
to digitalization
4. Lack of strategic
planning
for
cybersecurity
5. Effects
of
the
change
in
operations.
6. Complications of
heterogeneity
of
applications
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OPPORTUNITIES (+)

1. New lines of business in
developing markets
2. Technological maturity
3. Synergies port-city
4. Efficient and predictive
supply chain
EXTERNAL
5. Insertion in the global
FACTORS
Spanish chain on the
6. Partnership of Spanish
ports as connectors of
port activity
7. Increase in Spanish
foreign trade as a result
of the Spanish economic
development

THREATS (–)

11. Advantageous location
in relation to the
biggest
Spanish
economic centers as
well as logistics and
distribution centers
12. Location of the port in
the
Pan-European
Transport Corridor is
advantageous.
STRENGTHS
(+)
/
OPPORTUNITIES (+)
STRATEGY
Continuous improvement
hinged
on
proven
measurement of regular
processes, services and
products; Consolidating a
network of emerging
companies
and
new
business lines that develop
innovative products for the
port sector; Practically
apply new innovation
strategies; promoting the
adaptation and transition
from the logistics-port
sector to an Industry 4.0
state; Explicit data and
information-based
approach hinged on sound
practices for measurement
as a step stone for control
port performance.
.
STRENGTHS
THREATS
STRATEGY

(+)

WEAKNESSES (–) /
OPPORTUNITIES
(+) STRATEGY
Entering innovative
national
and
international
ecosystems;
Having a corporate
start-up incubator for
the
logistics-port
sector;
Accessing
financing
and
facilitating the capture
of private investment
for port innovation;
Port personnel must be
given the opportunity
to act creatively; Need
to accommodate both
“boat rockers” and
“can doers”

/ WEAKNESSES (–) /
(–) THREATS
(–)
STRATEGY
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1. Political and institutional
elements
2. Poor integration of other
actors in the port sector
3. Changes in legislation,
regulations
4. Systems vulnerable to
cyber threats
5. Asymmetry with other
modes of transport
6. International financial
uncertainty

Boost
logistical
eefficiency in the areas of
infrastructure, operations
and service provision,
improving environmental
and energy sustainability,
security and protection as
well as the digitalization of
intelligent processes and
platforms

There
should
be
enough
time
for
reflection
and
introspection;
Development
of
systems
including
control
systems,
innovation
management
information systems,
competitor analysis,
Appraisal,
training
and
development
systems,
and
recognitions systems.

A SWOT analysis, or, sometimes reversed as TOWS analysis, was performed for the
port of Valencia taken together and the result of the analysis is presented in a tabular
form (table 5.4) with the following areas covered: infrastructure; transport, shipping,
logistics (TSL) market and the administration and management operations sphere. The
analyses of the port together with the researcher's experience show that these areas
define the competitive position of seaports in Europe. Poor integration of other actors
in the port sector is a limitation. The change process towards the new port system and
the modification and replacement of facilities has led to an initial sluggishness and
ineptitude in port operations.
The IT and OT Systems are vulnerable to cyber threats. From port of Valencia through
the internet, the digitalization of the new ecosphere and the growth and development
of technologies show that the port is much more vulnerable and subtle to attacks
through cyberspace.
The intermodal transport development and inclusion of the port in the network of
intermodal terminals in Spain sequentially upsurges her importance in the European
and global supply chains. The key constituents which augment the competitive
position of the port of Valencia in European market are: suitably designed and
executed development strategies, financially sound and connected with the external
environment operation and services domains as well as the EU financial resources
dedicated to the development of the fully accessible port infrastructure.
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5.2.4. GAP Analysis: McKinsey 7-S Framework and PESTEL
This sub-sub-chapter provides the McKinsey 7-S Framework and PESTEL analysis of
the port of Valencia in Spain giving the components of the framework and
consequently indicating whether the port complies/aligns to or not. Five (points) is
given if compliance/alignment is found and zero (0) if there is no
compliance/alignment.
Table 5.5: Spanish/Port of Valencia Cybersecurity Strategy Analysis using the
McKinsey 7s Framework
McKinsey 7S Framework

Complies
Yes [05]

No [0.0]

STRATEGY


Involvement

in

the

cybersecurity

strategy Y

formulation


Simple, clear, and easily understood cybersecurity Y
strategies



Concise cybersecurity implementation stages and Y
timeline



The cybersecurity strategy is compatible with the Y
port’s vision and mission

Average Score

20/20

STRUCTURE


Clear integration and coordination mechanisms



Job allocation and authority to do those cybersecurity Y

N

related jobs


Simple organization structure of the port



Decentralized decision making process

Average Score

Y
N
10/20

SYSTEM


Availability of measurement and control mechanisms Y
for cybersecurity strategy implementation
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IT and OT systems to assist in cybersecurity strategy Y
implementation



N

Monitoring the effectiveness of Cybersecurity
strategy implementation



An open system: free flow of information between Y
the departments/branches within the port

Average Score

15/20

STAFF


Sufficient number of employees to facilitate the Y
Cybersecurity implementation process



Level of education and experience of staff especially Y
in IT and OT operation



N

Availability of multi-disciplinary team involved in
the Cybersecurity strategy implementation



Good working relationship within members of the Y
IT/OT/Cybersecurity team

Average Score

15/20

STYLE


Support of key groups and other professionals Y
connected to Cybersecurity



Positive

attitude

of

leadership

towards

the Y

Cybersecurity strategy being implemented


Sufficient support from Top management in Y
cybersecurity strategy implementation



Leadership

style

allows

those

involved

in Y

Cybersecurity strategy implementation to participate
freely
Average Score

20/20

SKILLS


Efficient and sufficient feedback mechanisms

Y
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Availability of relevant IT/OT/Cybersecurity skills Y
and competences within the staff



Availability and allocation of financial resources Y
towards cybersecurity strategy implementation



Availability of sufficient ways of developing skills in Y
IT/OT/Cybersecurity

Average Score

20/20

SHARED VALUES


Employees’ belief in the vision and mission of the Y
organization



The organization’s culture and ability to change



Employee’s awareness of the Cybersecurity strategy Y

Y

being implemented


N

The Cybersecurity strategy is supported by the
prevailing local/ national culture

Average Score

15/20

Overall Score

120/140

Strategy adopted by a port is crucial since it determines the changes and methodologies
that a port utilizes to attract business, withstand competitive pressure and improve its
competitive position. Additionally, the port of Valencia has continuously involved all
stakeholders in the cybersecurity strategy formulation, setting in place a simple, clear,
and easily understood cybersecurity strategies. The respondents agreed that the port
have adopted several strategies to effectively compete and sustain. This component
was supported by an average score of 20/20.
The research respondents agreed vastly that good working relationship within
members of the IT/OT/Cybersecurity team lead to the success of the process of
implementation of cybersecurity strategy, and this is shown by average of 15/20 which
suggests there was consistency in the responses of respondents. It was further found
that respondents believed to a great extent that there is sufficient number of staff with
relevant skills and experience allocated for cybersecurity strategy implementation
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process leading to the success of the strategy with a score of 20/20 in the skills
component. The respondents also noted that there was availability of relevant skills
and competences within the staff that has led to the success of cybersecurity strategy
implementation process. This study also tried to find how the organization shared
values influenced the success of cybersecurity strategy implementation process. The
respondents vastly believed that awareness of the employees of the cybersecurity
strategy being implemented has resulted to the success of strategy implementation
process with a score of 15/20.
There were efficient and sufficient feedback mechanisms and the staff possess relevant
IT/OT/Cybersecurity skills and competences. The respondents also believed in the
availability and allocation of financial resources towards cybersecurity strategy
implementation and availability of sufficient ways of developing skills in
IT/OT/Cybersecurity with an average score of 20/20 in the skills component.
Table 5.6: Port of Valencia Analysis using the PESTEL Framework
PESTEL Framework

Aligned
Yes

No

POLITICAL FACTORS


Government stability/instability

Y



Corruption fight

Y



Favorable Tax policies

Y



Government regulation and deregulation

Y



Appropriate (cyber) defense expenditures

Y



Warm bilateral relationships

Y



Import-export regulation/restrictions

Y



Trade control

Y



Appropriate size of government budgets

Y

Average Score

45/45

ECONOMIC FACTORS


Favorable growth rate



Federal government budget deficits

Y
N
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Low unemployment trend

Y



Stock market trends

Y



Exchange rate

Y

Average Score

20/25

SOCIAL FACTORS


Population size and growth rate

Y



Attitudes towards foreign people

Y



Appropriate Education level

Y



Attitude towards work

Y



Wealth distribution

Y



Per capita income

Y



Average disposable income

Y



Attitude towards government

Average Score

N
35/40

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS


Technology incentives

Y



Automation

Y



R&D activity

Y



Technological change

Y



Access to new technology

Y



Level of innovation

Y



Technological awareness

Y



Internet infrastructure

Y



Communication infrastructure

Y



Life cycle of technology

Y

Average Score

50/50

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS


Weather

Y



Climate

Y



Environmental policies

Y
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Climate change



Pressures from NGO’s



Natural disasters

Y



Air and water pollution

Y



Recycling standards

Y



Attitudes towards green products

Y



Support for renewable energy

Y

Average Score

Y
N

45/50

LEGAL FACTORS


Discrimination laws

Y



Antitrust laws

Y



Employment laws

Y



Consumer protection laws

Y



Copyright and patent laws

Y



Health and safety laws

Y



Education laws

Y



Consumer protection laws

Y



Data protection laws

Y

Average Score

45/45

Overall Score

240/255

According to the study, Spain is a stable democracy with efficient fight on corruption
and favourable tax policies. The country also has got appropriate (cyber) defense
expenditures with great bilateral relationships with neighbours, EU and the globe
thereby scoring an average of 45/45 on political factors component. This is good for
cybersecurity strategy implementation. On the economic factors component, the
country is believed to possess favourable growth rate only hindered a little bit by
COVID 29 pandemic, but rebounding fast. The country also has got very low
unemployment rate with great stock market trends thereby scoring an average of 20/25.
The population size and growth rate is favourable and the citizens has got good
attitudes towards foreign people, work, but unfavourable attitude towards government
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especially with the botched succession plan of Catalonia. The country also has good
income per head and disposable income is attractive, scoring 35/40 on the social
factors component.
The country of Spain and port of Valencia has got great technology incentives with
state of the art automation, high level of innovation and bustling R&D activities. The
is excellent response to technological change and access to new technology. The
citizens are highly aware of new technological and the internet and communication
infrastructure is very good, scoring a whopping 50/50 in the technological factors
component. Spain also boasts of good climate and weather, great environmental
policies, and attitudes towards green products with an increased support for renewable
energy, scoring 45/50 in the environmental factors component. The country has got in
place working and efficient Discrimination, Antitrust, Employment, Consumer
protection, Copyright and patent, Health and safety, Education, Consumer protection,
and Data protection laws - scoring an average of 45/45 in the legal factors component.
5.3. Maritime Cybersecurity Implementation Metrics assessment in developed
(Europe) and developing (Africa) Countries
Table 5.7: Cybersecurity threat and risk mitigation measures at the two ports
Control

Control Name

No.
1

Control Policy and Procedures for Access

2

Management of Accounts

3

Access Enforcement

4

Revocation of Access Authorizations

Mombasa

Port of

Port

Valencia

5
Access enforcement/Controlled release
6

Information flow enforcement

7

Information flow enforcement/metadata

8

Information
flow
Authentication

enforcement/Domain
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9

11

Information flow enforcement/validation of
metadata
Information flow enforcement/physicallogical separation of information flows
Separation of Duties

12

Least Privilege

13
14

Least Privilege/Privileged Access by nonorganizational users
Remote Access

15

Remote Access/Protection of Information

16

Wireless Access

17

Access Control for Mobile Devices

18

Use of External IT and OT

20

21

External
IT
and
OT
organizationally
systems/components/devices
Sharing of Information

22

Publicly accessible content

23

Access control decisions

24
25

Policy and procedures covering Security
awareness and training
Security training that are Role-based

26

Physical Security training

27
28

Audit and
procedures
Audit events

29

Analysis, Audit review, and reporting

30

Analysis,
Audit
review,
and
reporting/association with information from
sources that are non-technical

10

accountability

usage/nonowned

policy

and
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31

Non-repudiation

32

Identity association

33

35

Validation of binding of information for
producer identity
Non-repudiation connected to chain of
custody
Audit generation

36

Monitoring for information disclosure

37

Cross-port auditing

38
39

Cross-port auditing-that is sharing of audit
information
Authorization and Security assessment

40

Security Assessments

41

Security Assessments/specialized assessment

42

External organizations security assessments

43

Interconnection of systems

44

System interconnections/Unclassified nonnational security system connections
System
interconnections/connections
to
public networks

34

45

The metrics assessment of the two ports under study clearly shows that cybersecurity
strategy implementation from a technical/practical point of view targeting cyber
threat/risk mitigation is more advanced in Europe - Spain (Port of Valencia) as
compared to Africa – Kenya (Port of Mombasa). Both ports demonstrated effective
practice on control policy and procedures for access, accounts management, and access
enforcement. Other areas where both ports were seen to have acted efficiently in an
effort to mitigate cyber threats and risks included: information flow enforcement;
domain authentication; separation of duties; least privilege policy; publicly accessible
content; remote access; protection of information; wireless access; use of external IT
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and OT; access control for mobile devices; non-repudiation connected to chain of
custody, and cross-port auditing among others.
However, there are critical areas where port of Valencia beats Mombasa port in
compliance, that included; revocation of access authorizations; metadata and
validation of metadata information flow enforcement; privileged access by nonorganizational users; non-organizationally owned IT/OT systems/components/devices
usage; analysis, audit review, and reporting/association with information from sources
that are non-technical; identity association; validation of binding of information for
producer identity; monitoring for information disclosure; external organizations
security assessments; and system interconnections/unclassified non-national security
system connections, among others. This puts Port of Valencia in the upper hand
compared to Mombasa port in relation to cybersecurity implementation practices.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION
6.1.

Conclusion

With ports globally undergoing rapid digital makeover, cybersecurity has to be
observed not simply as a crucial issue to be well thought-out in rapports of custody
with the technical developments but on the other hand as a facilitator of additional
growths and computerisation.
The previous chapters additionally provide a listing of sensible baseline security
measures to strengthen cybersecurity in port operations and systems.
It should be understood that the people responsible for port cybersecurity, that include
the CIOs, CISOs, and ICT Managers found in the two Port Authorities.
The models of Cybersecurity measures pursued by European and African ports faces
and presents a multitude of challenges and risks including; Infrastructure challenges,
talent for Cybersecurity, technology, strategy, governance, product, crime/fraud,
reputation, and regulation, among others. However, one outstanding risk is the rapid
change in technology and innovation that has greatly affected Cybersecurity strategies
in that these strategies become redundant and obsolete before optimal use.
There is need for cybersecurity to be well acknowledged as a significant element of
maritime security and should therefore be incorporated into both the European and
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African maritime security apparatuses and frameworks. Likewise, as ICTs are being
integrated day by day into all facets of human life, significant attention has to be given
in detail to the traits of maritime cybersecurity. Cybersecurity in ports in this digital
age is becoming more complicated than ever as security technology – including
methods to evade it are gaining in sophistication.
European Union and African Union states should at this point work closely with the
private sector for efficient and effective sharing of knowledge and understanding with
reference to explicit problems faced by the industry. Additionally, the EU and AU
should institutionalise the responses of member states in relation to these types of
security risks including raising awareness around the vulnerability and cyber threats
concerning the maritime sphere.
Kenyan ports have not developed her own comprehensive Cybersecurity reports and
are relying on other related reports to monitor some risks that are directly linked to
Cybersecurity. They also don’t employ a comprehensive approach to Cybersecurity,
seldom integrating Cybersecurity strategies in all areas of operations and in the
organizational culture. There are also a number of unmet requirements/gaps in the way
Cybersecurity systems at the ports are managed.
European and African ports need to prioritize digital risk assessment and reinforce
updated Cybersecurity practices to ensure that all data is private, encrypted, and
secured appropriately. As government and regulatory bodies are also becoming more
aware of the risks and threats to Cybersecurity and other digital operations at ports,
regulations and compliance requirements must increase concurrently and ports should
be held to a higher standard for maintaining Cybersecurity.
In conclusion therefore, significantly grander energies and consideration should be
focused towards making sure Africa and Kenya’s cybersecurity is intact. In lieu of
that, and given the pervasiveness of non-African indication on maritime cybersecurity
incidents, increased Africa-specific knowledge and research is obligatory. This
dissertation shall help stakeholders that are active in implementing cybersecurity in
ports.
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6.2.

Summary of Findings

While this study focuses on comparing the cybersecurity implementation practices for
ports in developed and developing countries, it also reveals some findings that I hope
can contribute to a more sustainable and safer cybersecurity implementation that
especially serve low resource countries at scale. I summarize these findings here.
Both ports face a multitude of challenges and risks in cybersecurity implementation
that include; talent for cybersecurity, technology, strategy, governance, crime/fraud,
reputation, and regulation, among others. The rapid change in technology and
innovation has greatly affected cybersecurity implementation strategies in that these
strategies become redundant and obsolete before optimal use and the results from this
study show very clearly that the port is worried about the potential for technology to
do harm by encouraging irresponsible behavior and exploiting lack of IT and OT
sophistication.
The study shows that the ports under study are trying to digitize more of its
departments, functions, processes and services and to a lesser extent, cybersecurity
risk management.
The ports and shipping industry is undergoing rapid technological and digital
transformation where such change is improving efficiency and effectiveness.
Mombasa port is not yet dedicating sufficient resources so as to address both the
current and future challenges to cybersecurity.
The port of Mombasa lacks specific research and knowledge on maritime
cybersecurity even though it is in an advantageous position to learn from developed
countries such as Europe-Spain-Valencia port to mitigate future cyber threats and
address vulnerabilities.
Mombasa port does not have clearly defined threat/risk management policies and
procedures for not only IT/OT/Cybersecurity but also other non-technology risks such
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as reputation risk, operational risk and strategic risk that also affects cybersecurity
implementation.
The cybersecurity risk management tools being used at Mombasa port are very limited
and the port do not have in place an independent review of their cybersecurity
implementation functions.
There are no enterprise wide IT/OT/Cybersecurity risk management systems instituted
at Mombasa port and in most cases, cybersecurity risks and threats are being managed
in silos.
The board at both ports is spending less time on cybersecurity issues and are in most
cases not actively engaged and involved in cybersecurity risk policy setting and
governance. Cybersecurity risk management is literally not embedded into the “fabric”
of both ports.
Mombasa port is, to a larger extent, adding digital technology to older/legacy IT/OT
and business processes technology rather than creating separate digital departments or
incubator units. This is leading to problems of infrastructure configuration, integration,
management and update.
Mombasa port recognizes a lack of resource allocation as the most impeding influence
to cybersecurity implementation. They also regret a lack of management awareness
and risk aversion to innovation and new technologies.
In conclusion therefore, Cybersecurity threats and risks facing ports in both developing
and developed countries are likely to grow and become increasingly complex with
ports becoming increasingly reliant on technology to run their operations and services
and with the rate of technological change continuing at a very fast pace. Whereas
reliance on technology brings obvious benefits, it also evident that ports are
increasingly vulnerable to system failures, data losses and cyber-attacks. Trends
towards more social networking, the growth of cloud computing, varying and
ambiguous (and often lagging) national ICT regulation will only add more salt to
injury.
6.3. Recommendation
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Ports and ships worldwide are all the time using systems that heavily depend on
digitization, automation and integration. Hence, as a consequence, security of data and
a number of other sensitive information has come to be a major concern of maritime.
Here are some recommendations that will un doubtfully help maintain maritime cyber
security in developing countries at the state level and beyond.
a) Malware Prevention: Ports and ship owners should implement a fitting policy
for anti-malware geared towards in-depth defense in their networks that is both
on-board and ashore including filtering out malicious content and unauthorized
access.
b) Management of Incidents: Is extremely important that a port or ship pin points
any source, internal or external that specializes in incident management
because evidence and research shows that effective and efficient incident
management policies and processes do helps in improving resilience and
consequently reducing any impact in relation to maritime cyber security.
c) Controls directed to removable media: Policy of removable media is known
to; limit the types and also quantity of media that can be used together with the
systems, users, and information types that can be moved, control the use of
removable media for the import and export of information. So this can be
priceless for the ports to implement.
d) Regime directed to Risk Management: The are very many benefits associated
to embedding an appropriate risk management regime across a port and/or
shipping organization. Ports should ensure they clearly communicate their risk
management approach through the development policies and practices that are
applicable.
e) Secure configuration: Another important aspect is that of configuration
management which is known to improve the systems security and also
eliminate the give and take risk of both them and any information. For that
reason, ports should ensure they develop a strategy directed towards removing
needless functionality from systems as well as quickly fixing identified
vulnerabilities.
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f) Monitoring: Ports should quickly devise means to detect actual or attempted
attacks on systems and services. Monitoring at this juncture allows ports to
guarantee that systems are appropriately being used as well as acting in
accordance with any regulatory requirement.
g) Managing user privileges: At the port, all users need to be provided with a
judicious level of privileges and rights to system that are required for each role.
It should be understood that the granting privileges of highly raised up system
privileges has to be controlled and managed carefully.
h) Education and awareness of employees: The port administrators should know
that personnel both aboard and ashore do play an important role in relation to
cybersecurity therefore it is critical that the technology and rules related to
security that are provided should be in position to enable them to do their work.
There should be a methodical awareness distribution of programmers and
training so as to deliver security expertise and at the same time assist in
establishing a culture that is conscious of security.
i) Remote system access: Port management should ensure that policies and
procedures that are risk based are set up so as to sustain remote access to
systems that are also appropriate to service providers. This is critical because
remote system access do not only offer countless benefits, but on the other hand
it also disclosures new risks. In relation to a number of other digital
developments, specialists do recommend collaboration, cooperation and
resilience in order to crack through to the right answers when it comes to
maritime cyber security
j) The Kenyan government/Mombasa port need to follow best practices by
ensuring the cybersecurity of their port infrastructure and also compliance with
the International Maritime Organization guidelines for cybersecurity for
vessels as is the case with European ports/Port of Valencia.
k) Member states of Africa including Kenya need to ratify and align with the
Malabo Convention including increasing efforts to generate the administrative
and legal framework it imagines as is the case with European countries/Port of
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Valencia and the European Legal Framework. This is because cybersecurity
hinge on shared security and capability to deal with risks and threats.
l) Because of the interlocked nature of many regions in areas such as trade and
infrastructure, African/Kenyan governments and ports need to become
aggressively involved with the regional maritime and cybersecurity
institutions. African states need to follow a regional methodology to cyber
maritime security as is the case with European ports/Port of Valencia and the
European Union.
m) Like how the European Ports and countries conduct maritime cybersecurity
related research, African/Kenyan Ports/Mombasa port need to conduct
maritime cybersecurity related research so as to address the gap caused by the
lack of maritime cybersecurity related research in African states
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